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Abstract 
 
This article examines right-leaning press representations of people living in the UK who can’t 
speak English following the 2011 Census, which was the first to ask questions about 
respondents’ linguistic background and competence in English. The analysis takes a corpus-
assisted approach to critical discourse analysis and is based on a 2 million-word corpus of right-
leaning newspaper articles about ‘speak(ing) English’, published between 2011 and 2016. The 
analysis shows the tendency for the press to focus on immigrants – particularly in education 
and health contexts – who are represented and discussed with recourse to a series of 
argumentation strategies, or ‘topoi’. These topoi are problematic as they present paradoxes, 
obscure the role of the Government in ensuring integration, overlook the difficulties of 
language learning and cultural assimilation, and generally contribute to a broader UK anti-
immigrant media narrative which serves to legitimise exclusionary and discriminatory 
practices against people from minority linguistic and ethnic backgrounds.   
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Introduction 
 
In 2011, for the first time, the Census of the United Kingdom (UK) asked respondents to 
identify their main language and indicate how well they could speak English. The results 
revealed that, of the 4.2 million UK residents whose main language was not English, 79 per 
cent (3.3 million people) said they could speak English ‘Well’ or ‘Very well’, while 17 per cent 
(726,000 people) said they could speak English but ‘Not well’, and 3 per cent (138,000 people) 
said they could not speak English at all (ONS, 2013). The result of the Census therefore showed 
remarkable linguistic homogeneity, with 99.74 per cent of UK residents (53.9 million people) 
having some command of English either as a main or additional language.  
This historic Census item and its result were widely reported across the (particularly 
right-leaning) press at the time of the Census and in the years that followed it. However, this 
press coverage has not been studied from a linguistic or critical discourse perspective. Yet, 
studying newspaper data is important in this context because the media has the potential not 
only to reflect but also powerfully influence understandings of and attitudes toward the social 
world for large numbers of people (Fowler, 1991). This is certainly the case for debates 
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surrounding issues like language, immigration and citizenship since, as Blackledge (2005, p. 
67) points out, ‘representations of minority ethnic groups in news media can validate diversity 
and solidarity, or contestation and differentiation’. This study aims to address this gap in 
research by examining the UK print media’s response to the Census result. Taking a corpus-
assisted approach to critical discourse analysis, the analysis aims to identify argumentation 
strategies, or ‘topoi’, relating to the representation of people who can’t speak English in a 2 
million-word corpus of right-leaning UK national newspaper articles published between 2011 
and 2016 – the five years following this historic Census. 
The article begins by introducing the 2011 Census and the UK socio-political context 
in which it took place, outlines the connections – as we and others view them – between 
language, identity and nationalism, and then reviews relevant research concerned with 
language ideologies in the press. Following this, the methodology section describes the 
compilation of the corpus and introduces our corpus-assisted approach to critical discourse 
analysis. The analysis outlines the recurring topoi used in the articles to represent people who 
can’t speak English. The implications of these topoi are then considered in the discussion 
section, before we conclude the article by reviewing the main findings and offering suggestions 
for future research on English language ideologies in the press.    
 
 
Background 
 
The 2011 Census, language and politics in the UK 
 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS), the recognised national statistical institute of the UK, 
holds a national ‘Census’ survey every ten years. The Census aims to collate ‘the most complete 
source of information about the population’ to allow ‘central and local Government, health 
authorities and many other organisations to target their resources more effectively’ (ONS, 
2016). The 2011 Census was the first to include specific questions about language. Specifically, 
Question 18 asked respondents, ‘What is your main language?’ and required them to tick one 
of two options: ‘English’ or ‘Other’. If the language was ‘Other’, there was a space to specify 
which language. In Question 19, individuals were asked ‘How well can you speak English?’, 
and were required to choose one of the following options: ‘Very well’, ‘Well’, ‘Not well’, or 
‘Not at all’. Responses to items 18 and 19 in the Census revealed that English was the main 
language for 92 per cent (49.8 million) of usual UK residents aged three years and over. Of the 
remaining 8 per cent (4.2 million) who had a different main language, 79 per cent (3.3 million) 
could speak English ‘Well’ or ‘Very well’, 17 per cent (726,000) could speak English but ‘Not 
well’, and 3 per cent (138,000) could not speak English at all (ONS, 2013). Despite 99.74 per 
cent of residents (53.9 million) speaking English either as a main or additional language, the 
immediate media response to the results told a different story, focussing on that relatively small 
portion of the respondents who stated that they could not speak English at all.  For example, 
the BBC ran an article with the headline ‘138,000 speak no English – Census’ (BBC, 2013). 
Such a headline is indicative of the wider media response to the Census results – a response 
which was at best sensationalist, and at worst served to ‘feed xenophobia’ (Sebba, 2017, p. 
279). 
 As Sebba (2017, p. 271) notes, the decision taken in 2007 to include a question in the 
2011 Census asking respondents about their language coincided with ‘a period when language 
was very much part of the public policy agenda’. Sebba (2017, pp. 269–71) positions this 
agenda as emerging from the emphasis placed by successive UK Governments on the 
integration and cohesion of incoming immigrants to UK communities. First, the Community 
Cohesion Review Team was established in 2001 and considered the English Language as a 
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national value, setting out expectations that everyone entering the country should use English 
in the interests of community cohesion. Later, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion 
was formed in 2007 which called for a reduction in the provision of multilingual translations 
of documents by local Government authorities on the basis that such translations undermine 
efforts to integrate non-English speaking residents. Therefore, Sebba (2017, p. 274) argues that 
the addition of the language-related questions to the Census in 2011 occurred against a policy 
backdrop that could be characterised as ‘pro-integration’ and ‘anti-multilingualism’. 
Language issues have remained subject to scrutiny and policy changes since the Census 
and throughout the timeframe which will be covered by our analysis (2011–2016). English 
language proficiency has been a legislative requirement for UK citizenship applications since 
1981, and in more recent years, language requirements and proficiency testing have changed 
in a number of ways. The British Nationality Act of 1981 stated that applicants for citizenship 
must have ‘sufficient knowledge of the English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic Language’. The 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 added the requirement that applicants 
demonstrate sufficient knowledge about life in the UK. In 2005, the Knowledge Of Language 
and Life (KOLL) requirement was introduced as a statutory condition for citizenship 
applications and in 2007 this was extended to applications for permanent settlement in the UK. 
By 2011, the KOLL requirement could be demonstrated either by passing the ‘Life in the UK’ 
test or by obtaining an English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) qualification. In 2013, 
at the mid-point of the time period covered by our analysis, the requirements were made more 
stringent, as it became compulsory for applicants both to pass the Life in the UK test and obtain 
a speaking and listening qualification in English at B1 CEFR or higher from an accredited 
institution. Furthermore, in 2010 language requirements and pre-entry English tests were 
extended to partners and spouses of British citizens, a group who had previously been exempt 
from such measures. In 2015, the lawfulness of this change was upheld in two highly-
publicised cases wherein the Supreme Court ruled that pre-entry English tests of spouses did 
not breach their right to a private and family life. In 2016, the required linguistic proficiency 
of all immigrants to the UK (not just those seeking citizenship) was written into legislation, as 
section 19 of the Immigration Act 2014 amended the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 2002 by inserting Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (public interest 
considerations), which legislates: 
 
It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-
being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the 
United Kingdom are able to speak English, because persons who can speak 
English— 
 
(a) are less of a burden on taxpayers, and  
(b) are better able to integrate into society.  
 
Most recently, the Immigration Act 2016 enforced a manifesto pledge made by the 
Conservative Government to ensure that every person who works in the public sector (e.g. in 
schools, hospitals, law enforcement, social care) and who has a customer-facing role speaks 
‘fluent English’.  
There is, therefore, a rich legislative and policy context, characterised by these key 
changes, for the period leading up to and following the 2011 Census. These contextual factors 
are worth bearing in mind, as they are likely to play a role in shaping public discourse 
surrounding matters pertaining to language, nationality and immigration. Sebba (2017, p. 269) 
attributes some of the anti-multilingualism agenda enacted by the Labour Government in the 
early 2000s, particularly in relation to Asian languages, to increased and sustained public 
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concern ‘about immigration and race issues’ in the wake of terrorist attacks in New York City 
on 9/11 2001 and London in 2005. If this connection between public opinion on immigration 
and language-related Government policy changes stands true, then it may be the case that the 
UK’s decision to leave the European Union following a referendum in June 2016 – approaching 
the end-point of our data – flavours some of these immigration-language public media debates. 
Indeed, a headline from the Guardian on 1st June 2016, a few weeks before the aforementioned 
referendum, reads ‘Migrants must have good English in post-Brexit UK, says leave campaign’. 
The various policy and legislative changes in relation to language requirements for immigrants, 
and public attitudes towards immigration more generally, provide important context for the 
intersection of discourses around immigration, identity and language in the British print media, 
both in the years preceding the 2011 Census, which is the stimulus for this study, and in the 
years following the Census, which provide the data for our analysis.  
 
Language, identity and nationalism 
 
In the context of language ideological discussions, notions of language and national identity 
are often couched in terms of Anderson’s (2006) ‘imagined communities’ (Barbour, 2000; 
Pavlenko & Norton, 2007). Anderson (2006, p. 6) posits that ‘nations’ are socially constructed 
communities, ‘imagined’ because members will never meet or know their fellow members, 
‘yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’. It is commonly held that 
‘language is a prime determinant of nationalist identity (Billig, 1995, p. 29), and Blackledge 
(2009, p. 69) notes that one obvious way ‘to link language and national identity is through 
language policy, planning and standardization practices which legitimize particular language 
varieties and link them to specific identities’. Indeed, the testing of a migrant’s proficiency in 
the national or official languages of the country to which they are moving is increasingly 
dominating public debate surrounding integration and citizenship (Milani, 2015). As long as 
language is marked as central to the concept of ‘the nation’, then language and linguistic 
variation will inform individuals’ imagined nation. Ideologies and practices hinging on the 
desirability or necessity of some languages over others create a ‘linguistic market, dominated 
by the official language’ of a given nation (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 45). Under such conditions, 
language becomes a means by which to determine ‘who is in’ and ‘who is out’, with linguistic 
minorities commonly ‘“invented” by, and in relation to, the linguistic majority’ as an inferior 
out-group (Blackledge, 2009, p. 69). 
Politically entrenched ideological systems such as this contribute to the notion that the 
imagined nation is a monolingual, linguistically homogenous society. In countries such as the 
UK, this imagined ‘one language, one nation’ myth (Piller, 2001, p. 261) is at odds with the 
heterogeneous, multilingual reality, and serves to exclude speakers of minority languages (in 
this case, languages other than English) who may be denied access to, or membership of, the 
linguistically dominant majority community, whether that is real or imagined (Blackledge, 
2005, p. 46). Such ideologies of inclusivity versus exclusivity can give rise to interethnic 
conflict within a nation where attitudes favouring monolingualism interlink with ideals of a 
monoethnic, monoreligious, monoideological state, in which differences are viewed as being 
‘dangerous’ to the ‘purity’ of society (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998, p. 265). As Blackledge 
and Pavlenko (2001, p. 243) note, this leads not only to the exclusion of those who are unable 
or unwilling to fit ‘the norm’, but also to the active discrimination against such individuals or 
groups. This view aligns with Lippi-Green’s (2012, p. 68) ‘standard language ideology’, which 
proposes that an idealized nation-state has one perfect homogenous language. This ideology, 
Lippi-Green (2012, p. 74) argues, props open a ‘back door’ to discrimination and prejudice that 
would normally be considered racism (e.g. discriminating against people on the basis of their 
race or ethnicity), but which is couched within, and concealed by, talk about language.  
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Language ideologies regarding homogeneity and the creation of the linguistic 
marketplace are upheld by powerful national institutions (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 46), the most 
obvious example being Government policies such as proficiency testing. However, Blackledge 
(2005) demonstrates how UK media and political discourse more generally has the potential to 
reinforce language ideologies and legitimize linguistic discrimination by consistently 
positioning English as ‘above other languages spoken and written in multilingual England’ 
(Blackledge, 2005, p. 225), all the while constructing negative associations with non-English, 
particularly Asian, languages. Building on the pioneering work by Reisigl and Wodak (2000, 
2001), Blackledge (2005) draws on the concept of topoi, as we do in this study, to interpret the 
representational and argumentational strategies identified in his data. According to Blackledge 
(2005, p. 67), topoi can be defined as ‘parts of argumentation that belong to obligatory, either 
explicit or inferable, premises. They are the content-related warrants or “conclusion rules” that 
connect the argument with the conclusion of a claim’ (see also: Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 75). 
For Blackledge (2005), topoi resemble key discursive strategies in media texts surrounding 
language debates, while Reisigl & Wodak (2000) suggest that topoi are powerful and 
influential discourse strategies for the reproduction of discriminatory discourse. Taking various 
examples from local news reportage and political speeches, Blackledge (2005) demonstrates 
how the topos of advantage/usefulness is used to argue that if an action is useful then it should 
be done. In the context of a multicultural society, this topos can be used to argue that an action 
can be justified or rationalized on the grounds that it is of benefit to the minority (linguistic) 
group(s). At the same time, Blackledge (2005) explores how the topos of danger or threat is 
used to link speakers of Asian languages and their actions to specific dangerous or threatening 
consequences, while the topoi of finance and burdening/weighting down was used to represent 
the speakers of Asian languages as financially costly and otherwise burdensome for ‘the 
taxpayer’. These topoi are similar to those identified by Hart (2010) in his critical analysis of 
media representations of immigrants. However, Hart (2010, p. 67) identifies a number of topoi 
that are not discussed by Blackledge, but which can be used in the context of non-native English 
speaker representations. Namely, the topos of culture, which holds that the out-group have 
irreconcilable differences in norms and values to the in-group, and the topos of displacement, 
which reflects the belief that the in-group will eventually be outnumbered by the out-group and 
be usurped as the dominant group within a given population. The similarity and overlap 
between the topoi identified by Blackledge in relation to multilingualism and Hart in relation 
to immigration show that the discourses surrounding both of these issues are likely to draw 
upon and perpetuate similar beliefs and ideologies which group language, identity and 
belonging under the umbrella of nationality or nationalism. Connections drawn between 
language and nationality thus correspond with the ‘racialization’ of the non-native English 
speaker, as identified by Shuck (2006). In the context of the United States, Shuck (2006, pp. 
259–60) describes the ways in which public discourse around non-English languages is 
expressed ‘using rhetorical patterns most often associated with discussions of race and 
ethnicity’. The racialization and the nationalization of public discourse about language and 
multilingualism serve the same purpose; that is, to relate language to categories of identity, and 
to emphasize differences between dominant majorities and marginalised minorities.   
 
Minority languages and negative representations in the press 
 
Lippi-Green (2012, p.144) argues that the power of the media in the political process of 
language subordination ‘can hardly be underestimated’. Blackledge (2002) undertakes a 
detailed qualitative analysis of a short local news item from the Birmingham Evening Mail and 
concludes that the piece is ‘monolingualizing’, in that it expresses the implicit ideology that 
monolingualism is representative of ‘Britishness’, while multilingualism is ‘retrograde and 
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tribal’ (Blackledge 2002, p. 84). Similarly, Blackledge (2005, p.226) finds that in the UK 
context, negative features associated with Asian languages and their speakers in media and 
political discourse include civil disorder, racial violence, social segregation, threats to 
democracy and burdens on society. Such negative representations of speakers of minority 
languages are not restricted to the UK. For example, in the coverage of language testing in 
Sweden, Milani (2007, p. 125) highlights the ways in which media narratives are built on the 
assumption that migrants are unwilling or too ‘lazy’ to integrate into Swedish society. Similarly, 
in the German context, Stevenson (2006, p. 151) finds a politician represented in the press as 
associating the linguistic proficiency of non-native German schoolchildren to ‘ghettoes in our 
cities, which lead to social conflicts’. What these studies have in common, despite analysing 
the press of different European nations, is the observation of the tendency of the press to 
promote ideals about monolingualism and a national language, while at the same time 
denigrating multilingualism and negatively representing individuals or groups whose main 
language is one other than the dominant variety.  
The focus on problems related to speakers of non-dominant languages – languages 
other than English for our purposes – might be simply explained by the fact that problems make 
news; it is generally agreed that newsworthiness or ‘news value’ is found in negativity, rather 
than in positive stories (Galtung and Ruge 1965, p. 69). Therefore, rather than necessarily being 
driven by negative attitudes towards multilingualism, the unfavourable representations of non-
English languages and their speakers may be an inevitable product of the news genre. However, 
as Bednarek (2016, p. 30) argues, negativity in the context of newsworthiness is subjective; 
while some audiences may consider a particular issue or happening as negative, others may not. 
Multilingualism, or people living in the UK and speaking languages other than English, may 
be a problem for some target audiences but not others. Therefore, in making choices regarding 
the topics and discourses that are drawn on alongside discussions of language, some parts of 
the media construct multilingualism as a problem. In other words, it is the media itself which 
renders issues to do with multilingualism as newsworthy by presenting those issues as negative 
and problematic. By associating languages other than English (and the speakers of those 
languages) with issues such as laziness, crime, violence, social segregation and conflict, the 
press creates links between non-English languages and problems which are likely to be 
generally agreed upon as being ‘negative’ by all audiences. This way, multilingualism and non-
native English speakers become part of the problem, as the media exploit the newsworthiness 
of such social issues in making ‘linguistic and cultural diversity visible’ (Kelly-Holmes and 
Milani, 2011, p. 477). Once linguistic difference is made visible in this way, and is associated 
with negative social issues, speakers of minority languages become a target for distrust and 
discrimination by some members of the dominant English-speaking group. In this context, 
Blackledge (2002, p. 84) argues that close scrutiny of media discourse is required to 
‘understand how linguistic power relations operate to discriminate against linguistic minority 
individuals and groups’. The present study sets out to achieve just that, by examining how the 
right-leaning UK print media represent people living in the UK who cannot speak English, or 
at least who do not speak English as their first language.  
 
Methodology 
 
In this study, we take a corpus-assisted approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Corpus 
linguistics refers to a collection of methods that use specialist computer programs to study large 
collections of machine-readable text (a corpus, pl. corpora). CDA can be described as ‘a type 
of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, 
and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political 
context’ (van Dijk, 2015, p. 466; see also: Fairclough, 1995). 
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The combination of corpus linguistics and CDA is a powerful one, with each method 
helping to overcome some of the obstacles associated with the other. Because CDA research 
tends to be qualitative and interdisciplinary, analyses are often restricted in scope, focussing 
on only a few texts or examples. However, with corpus assistance, CDA can effectively deal 
with larger and more representative datasets, often running into millions and sometimes even 
billions of words in size. In this case, we are able to examine 3,854 press articles (2,006,031 
words) – a dataset that is likely to reveal a wider range of representations (and account for a 
longer time period) than would be possible had we adopted a purely manual approach. Corpus 
assistance can also add a degree of objectivity to CDA approaches because it offers a set of 
predictable analytical techniques and advocates a spirit of methodological transparency 
underpinned by two guiding principles: (i.) no systematic bias in the selection of texts included 
in the corpus (i.e. do not exclude a text because it does not fit a pre-existing argument or theory) 
and (ii.) total accountability (all data gathered must be accounted for) (McEnery & Hardie, 
2012). 
At the same time, our corpus-assisted approach also stands to benefit from its synthesis 
with CDA, for instance by being able to draw upon ideas and theoretical models advanced 
within existing CDA research (Baker et al., 2008). In particular, findings reported in existing 
CDA research into media representations of minority groups and language debates (particularly 
studies by Reisigl & Wodak (2000, 2001), Blackledge (2005) and Hart (2010)) provide useful 
concepts for interpreting the representations we identify (most notably here the CDA concept 
of ‘topoi’). Further to this, our corpus-assisted analysis is also enriched by CDA’s commitment 
to analysing social context (van Dijk, 2001), as we draw on our understandings of the real-
world contexts in which the newspaper articles in our data were produced and consumed, 
particularly in terms of UK language policy and the events leading up to and following the 
2011 Census, to attempt to understand the contextual events and circumstances that might have 
shaped or been shaped by the representations we observe. In the subsections that follow, we 
introduce the corpus under study and the approach we take to analysing it.   
 
Data: Speak English Corpus 
 
This study is based on the Speak English Corpus (SEC), a purpose-built corpus 
comprising right-leaning UK national newspaper articles concerned with the topic of speaking 
English, published between 2011 and 2016. The data start-point of 2011 was chosen because 
it was the year in which the language-related questions were introduced into the Census. The 
end-point of 2016 was chosen as this was the last full year that had passed when work on the 
project began. It was not possible for us to examine articles published by all UK national 
newspapers within the scope of this article. Therefore, for the purpose of this study we decided 
to focus on right-leaning press articles only. This decision was based on two considerations: 
(i.) the right-leaning press accounts for the majority of UK newspaper discourse (of the ten 
national newspapers, six are right-leaning, three are left-leaning and one is centrist; Baker et 
al. 2013), and (ii.) the right-leaning press published over twice as many articles concerned with 
the topic of speaking English (as we defined this – discussed later in this section) compared 
with the left-leaning press (3,854 vs. 1,696 articles, respectively). 
Articles were collected from the online searchable newspaper database LexisNexis. Our 
search criteria were that the words speak and English had to appear (contiguously or non-
contiguously) in the headline and/or lead paragraph for an article to be included in the corpus. 
The search included all right-leaning UK national newspapers – broadsheets and tabloids. 
Newswires were excluded, and similar results were grouped together to minimise the inclusion 
of duplicates (default search settings in LexisNexis).  
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The completed corpus is 2,006,031words in size, comprising 3,854 articles, sourced 
from six national right-leaning newspapers. The data included more traditional-style articles, 
but also columns, editorials, letters to the editor and opinion pieces. We decided to include all 
of these types of publication since they all occupy space on the pages and websites of the media 
outlets under study, are all consumed by readers, and all contribute to the English language 
ideologies that we are interested in uncovering (Gabrielatos, 2007, pp. 10–11). We did not filter 
the results for articles that we deemed not to be sufficiently ‘about’ the survey result or the 
topic of speaking English. The concept of ‘aboutness’ is complex in this context, as debates 
about language intersect, as we have already discussed, with numerous aspects of social life. 
Thus, deciding what does and does not count as an article relevant for our purposes presents 
difficulties (Scott, 2017) and would require us to make a series of subjective judgements which 
would impinge upon the replicability of our data collection procedures (Baker et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, we performed a ‘sanity check’ on the corpus to ensure that the proportion of 
‘false positives’ (i.e. articles that clearly had little to do with the English language) would not 
unduly influence our analysis. To do this, we extracted a random sample of 100 articles 
spanning all years and publication types. From this, we determined that just 3 articles had 
limited relevance to our purposes but the remaining 97 had something to do with the English 
language and those who (cannot) speak it. Table 1 provides a numerical breakdown of our 
corpus in terms of the number of words and articles per newspaper. 
 
[Table 1 here]1 
 
As this table shows, the corpus is imbalanced in terms of its representing tabloid and broadsheet 
newspapers, with broadsheet publications (Telegraph, Daily Mail, Times and Express) 
contributing 3,315 (86 per cent) of the articles and 1,888,483 (94 per cent) of the words in the 
corpus. This skew reflects the reality of right-leaning press publications in the UK, which tend 
to be broadsheet rather than tabloid. That each of the broadsheets published more articles about 
the topic of speaking English than each of the tabloids suggests that stories about people 
speaking (or not speaking) English to be picked up more frequently by right-leaning 
broadsheets compared with tabloids.2 We decided against redressing the imbalance between 
broadsheet and tabloid articles because we wanted the corpus to represent all available right-
leaning press coverage relating to the issue of speaking English within our given date range, 
and this imbalance in our corpus arguably represents the actual, real-life imbalance in terms of 
the types of media outlets that provided this coverage. Procedurally, this skew does not present 
much of an issue in terms of our analysis, since it is not our aim to compare broadsheet and 
tabloid representations. However, this imbalance in terms of what our corpus represents means 
that our analysis is likely to elucidate topoi and patterns in representation that are particularly 
prominent in right-leaning broadsheet articles. Data downloaded from LexisNexis includes a 
large amount of metadata and indexing information, which meant that the texts had to be pre-
processed to remove such elements from the data, leaving only the headlines and articles for 
analysis. The next section sets out the approach we used to analyse the corpus. 
 
Approach: Corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis  
 
Our corpus-assisted approach to CDA can be resolved into two parts. The first part aims at 
identifying the social actor groups (van Leeuwen, 1996) that are frequently mentioned in the 
context of (not) speaking English in the newspaper articles in our data. To do this, we use the 
corpus linguistic technique of collocation – a word association measure which tells us how 
often two or more words occur alongside one another in the corpus (Baker, 2006, p. 95) – to 
identify words denoting social actor groups which frequently co-occurred alongside the 
9 
 
expression ‘speak English’. We decided to use the phrase ‘speak English’ as an analytical entry 
point as it corresponds to the wording of one of the Census items that motivated this study (i.e. 
How well do you speak English?), and was also the search term used to source articles for the 
corpus. We generated a list of collocates for the phrase ‘speak English’, this time including 
words which occurred within the five words preceding and/or following ‘speak English’ 
(L5>R5) at least five times throughout the corpus (default values in WordSmith Tools). We 
then extracted all collocates denoting social actors and manually grouped them into broader 
social actor categories. In determining social actor groups, we began by manually scanning the 
list of collocates to identify words that ostensibly denoted people or groups of people. To group 
those words into categories, and check that words were in fact used to denote social actor 
groups, we inspected a random sample of concordance lines in which the word in question was 
used alongside the expression ‘speak English’. This also allowed us to resolve polysemous or 
otherwise ambiguous cases. To offer an example, the word Britain was a frequent collocate of 
‘speak English’ but tended to function within a prepositional phrase as an adverbial of place 
rather than a social actor, such as in this headline taken from the Telegraph: ‘If you don't speak 
English you can't belong in Britain’. 
Having identified the most frequent social actor groups discussed in relation to speaking 
English, we then analysed how those groups were represented across the articles in our corpus. 
To do this, we used the concordance technique (Baker, 2006, p. 71) as a means through which 
to analyse in more qualitative depth those articles in which ‘speak English’ occurred alongside 
words denoting the social actor group(s) of interest. By allowing us to examine more expansive 
chunks of text, in most cases newspaper articles in their entirety, the concordance technique 
provides a means for undertaking more theory-informed CDA. In this case, we interpret the 
linguistic strategies of representation that we observe in terms of ‘topoi’ (introduced earlier; 
see also: Reisigl & Wodak, 2000, 2001). Although topoi are, as we have described, ‘parts of 
argumentation’, in this study we do not analyse the texts in our corpus in terms of their 
argumentative structure or rhetorical goals but are instead more interested in identifying and 
critiquing their underlying ideologies relating to linguistic competence, national identity and 
(im)migration. 
To identify topoi, we followed Sinclair’s (2003) approach to reading concordance lines 
– for this, we analysed a random sample of 30 articles in which one or more of the social actor 
words collocated with the phrase ‘speak English’, recording any topoi we identified. We then 
repeated the procedure until the point at which new topoi ceased to emerge. In identifying topoi, 
we drew upon the taxonomy proposed initially by Reisigl and Wodak (2000, 2001) and 
elaborated by Blackledge (2005) and Hart (2010) based on studies of language ideological and 
immigration discourse. While there is no exhaustive list of topoi, the topoi identified across 
these studies collectively provide a useful interpretive framework for our analysis. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that topoi do not manifest in texts in any set or formulaic way 
and so their identification represents something of a subjective analytical process. Similarly, 
the process of labelling or ‘naming’ topoi can be equally subjective – a single topos might be 
interpreted differently by two researchers, while a third researcher might not even interpret it 
as a topos in the first place. For these reasons, corpus assistance provides an objective starting 
point for our analysis, but the identification of topoi requires more subjective interpretations 
be made by the researcher(s). In the present study, we have endeavoured to describe all our 
methodological decisions and in our analysis have provided examples which we deem to be 
representative of the particular topoi we observed. Corpus procedures were carried out using 
WordSmith Tools version 7 (Scott, 2016).  
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Analysis 
 
As outlined in the previous section, our analysis uses the expression ‘speak English’ as an entry 
point through which to examine how groups of social actors were represented in the context of 
the English language debates that were played out across the articles in our corpus. Before 
proceeding with our analysis, it is first worth noting that throughout the corpus the phrase 
‘speak English’ tends to be used as part of broader constructions that focus on people not 
speaking English. We generated a list of left-sided collocates (L5>L1) of the phrase ‘speak 
English’. From this list, we extracted the ten most frequent words which ostensibly served to 
pre-modify the search term in a way which expresses that a person or group either could not or 
should speak English (not, don’t, can’t, cannot, must, should, doesn’t, unable, didn’t, couldn’t). 
The combined co-occurrences of these ten items alone (n= 1,671) accounts for 56 per cent of 
the 2,984 mentions ‘speak English’ in the corpus. Since we have only considered the top ten 
collocates of this type, the figure of 56 per cent must be treated as a minimum. The focus on 
cases where people can’t (but should) speak English reflects the tendency of the press – and 
the mainstream media generally – to report stories about things and events that are problematic 
or in some way negative (Bourdieu, 1998). Yet, we might also interpret this focus as reflecting 
the tendency of the press to operate with a deficit model of linguistic competence, which 
foregrounds what a speaker cannot do, while backgrounding what they can.  
The analysis in this article focusses upon the three most frequent social actor groups 
collocating with ‘speak English’ in the corpus: SCHOOLCHILDREN, IMMIGRANTS and HEALTH 
(table 2). 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Although the three frequent social actor groups in table 2 are lexically distinct, they all 
tend to refer broadly to immigrants to the UK who are understood either to not speak English 
well or at all. In the case of the SCHOOLCHILDREN and HEALTH groups, the immigrants are 
functionalised; that is, they are ‘referred to in terms of something they do, for instance, an 
occupation or role’ (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 42). From the table above, we can see that, as well 
as being referred to as immigrants or migrants, immigrants are functionalised in our data 
according to their roles as, amongst other things, schoolchildren, patients, doctors and nurses. 
This functionalising tendency marks an interesting trend in our data, whereby immigrants tend 
to be discussed, with regard to speaking English at least, in the contexts of public services, 
particularly to do with schools and health. One consequence of such functionalising 
representations is that the immigrant referents are transported into readers’ worlds of 
immediate experience, so that they become ‘people “we” have to deal with in our everyday 
lives’ (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 36). This helps such stories to satisfy the newsworthiness 
criterion of familiarity (Galtung & Ruge, 1965), as the social actors being discussed are situated 
within public service contexts with which most readers will have direct experience and indeed 
a ‘stake’ as UK taxpayers. This conceivably makes the representations and associated topoi 
more relatable to readers’ own lives and experiences – a discursive move that arguably serves 
to heighten the relevance and emotive force of the stories. Having identified the most frequent 
groups of social actors who cannot or do not speak English, at least according to the articles in 
our corpus, we then set about examining the topoi that were used to represent these groups in 
the context of language ideological debates. This analysis is reported in the next section. 
To examine how the groups displayed in table 2 were represented in our corpus, we 
qualitatively analysed those articles in our corpus in which one or more of the social actor 
words collocated with the expression ‘speak English’. Although we used the concordance 
technique as a means for retrieving and organising such cases, in order to apprehend the topoi 
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being used, it was necessary for our analysis to go beyond the scope of the concordance line 
and consider whole articles in their entirety. Our analysis identified seven recurring topoi: (i.) 
displacement, (ii.) finance, (iii.) burdening and weighting down, (iv.) danger or threat, (v.) 
culture, (vi.) advantage/usefulness and (vii.) responsibility. Throughout the course of the 
analysis, we will explore each of these topoi in detail, providing textual evidence of their use 
across the articles in our corpus and interpreting each in terms of the broader language 
ideologies that underpin and are perpetuated by them. For the facility of analysis, the ensuing 
section will explore each topos in turn. However, as this analysis will show, these topoi all 
relate to and overlap with one another in the ways that they are used to represent the social 
actor groups featured in our data. 
 
Topos of displacement 
 
The first topos we identified in our corpus was the topos of displacement. The premise of this 
topos is that ‘the out-group will eventually outnumber and/or dominate the in-group’ (Hart, 
2010, p. 67). Linguistically, we interpret this topos to be invoked through the use of aggregation 
(van Leeuwen, 2008) – that is, the representation of migrants as living in the UK and not 
speaking English in large numbers. This topos was observed in relation to all three social actor 
groups – SCHOOLCHILDREN, IMMIGRANTS and HEALTH. The examples below relate to 
immigrants and were taken from articles responding to the publication of the 2011 Census 
results in January 2013. Note that all corpus extracts provided in this article were selected 
because we deemed them to be representative of the linguistic manifestation of the particular 
topos being discussed. 
 
800,000 migrants who cannot speak English 
(Telegraph, 30th January 2013) 
 
But if you only remember one statistic make it this: more than four million 
migrants do not speak English as their main language. The impact of this 
finding, which comes from newly released details in the 2011 Census, is 
profound. 
(Express, 1st February 2013) 
 
But 138,000 can speak no English and another 726,000 struggle with it 
(Sun, 5th March 2013) 
 
Although these extracts report the same Census data, there is considerable discrepancy between 
the figures provided, attesting to propensity for the (at least right-leaning) media to circulate 
inaccurate and conflicting information about the number of immigrants who do not speak 
English living in the UK. The rhetorical effect of this type of large-scale aggregation, we would 
argue, is that the statistics reported are rendered in as shocking and extreme terms as possible. 
For instance, the Telegraph headline reports that 800,000 migrants ‘cannot speak English’ 
(even though only 138,000 people self-reported as not being able to speak English – the others 
self-reported as speaking English ‘not well’). Though the Sun provides an arguably more 
nuanced picture of the statistics – distinguishing between those who struggle to speak English 
and those who cannot speak English at all – the linking expression ‘and another’ is likely, we 
would argue, to encourage readers to interpret each statistic as contributing to the same over-
arching trend: ‘But 138,000 can speak no English and another 726,000 struggle with it.’ 
The most extreme example of an article overlooking the nuances of the Census statistics 
can be found in the Express. The figure of four million+ immigrants does not represent either 
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the number of people who self-reported as not speaking English or not speaking English well, 
but the number of immigrants living in the UK who do not speak English as their first language. 
This statistic reveals nothing about the linguistic competence of the four million immigrants to 
which it relates and overlooks the reality that millions of people the world over communicate 
effectively using a second or additional language in all aspects of their daily lives. This can be 
interpreted as reflecting a shift in the UK political agenda, observed by Sebba (2017), whereby 
it is no longer considered sufficient for people of migrant origin to have ‘satisfactory’ 
knowledge of English, but they are now expected to use English as their main household 
language in order to demonstrate their willingness to integrate into UK life. 
The result of this trend is thus surely that native English speakers’ claim to dominant 
status is being weakened by the increasing numbers of residents who speak other languages. In 
the extreme, by repeatedly emphasising the large and increasing number of people living in the 
UK who speak languages other than English, such articles could induce in their perceived 
native English-speaking readership the fear that (or at least suggest to them the possibility that) 
they are increasingly becoming a linguistic minority in their own country. In other words, that 
the out-group will eventually replace the in-group as those with privileged and preferential 
access to social resources and will become ‘the majority whereupon they will gain control over 
the in-group and become the new cultural norm’ (Hart, 2010, p. 83).  
 
Topos of finance 
 
One consequence of the aggregating rhetoric explored in the previous section is that it allows 
people who can’t speak English to be rendered as what van Leeuwen (2008, p. 38) describes 
as ‘the object of “rational” economic calculation’ and, in turn, rendered as economically 
burdensome – in other words, presented through the topos of finance. Evidence of this can be 
found in articles alleging that the UK Government (and taxpayers) has incurred substantial 
financial costs in order to support immigrants who have limited English skills. For example, 
the following headline and leading paragraph, taken from the Mail on Sunday, purport to show 
the costs endured by police, councils and hospitals in translating documents for immigrants 
with limited English:   
 
How you pay £100m a year to aid immigrants who can't speak English: Shock 
figures reveal huge sums spent on translators by police, councils and hospitals 
 
• Police, hospitals and courts are all spending huge sums on translators  
• Councils in England spent £11 million on language services in last year  
• Polish is the most commonly translated language by courts and police  
• Met spends nearly £7million a year on interpreters for crime suspects 
(Mail on Sunday, 10th January 2015) 
 
This example is representative of a broader discourse of financial burden that recurs across the 
articles in our corpus, and also illustrates the tendency for costs associated with crime and 
policing to be foregrounded in these contexts. Three of the four bullet points in the leading 
paragraph refer to costs relating to crime and policing, arguably drawing on a link, by now 
well-established in the right-leaning press, between immigration and crime (van Dijk, 1991). 
It is notable, also, that readers are addressed directly as the bearers of these purported costs – 
‘How you pay £100m a year’ – enforcing further the sense of opposition between immigrants 
and readers, who are indexed here as non-immigrant, English-speaking tax-payers.  
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As well as constituting a financial burden on public sector services, immigrants are also 
represented as being economically burdensome as a result of the social welfare benefits they 
are purported to receive: 
 
Benefits ‘to be stripped from immigrants who cannot speak English’; David 
Cameron intends to make the cuts in order to slash the country's welfare bill, 
according to reports 
(Telegraph, 19th January 2014) 
 
TORY plans to strip benefits from migrants who can't speak English have been 
blocked by, you guessed, Nick Clegg. 
(Express, 21st January 2014) 
 
The first extract, taken from the Telegraph, reports the intention of then-UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron to prevent immigrants who can’t speak English from receiving social welfare 
benefit. However, the Government at the time was a coalition formed of Cameron’s 
Conservative Party and Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats, the latter of which opposed the 
introduction of such measures (much to the frustration of the right-leaning media; see extract 
from the Express).  
The representation of immigrants who can’t speak English as constituting a financial 
burden was also evident in the discourse surrounding other groups. For example, in the extracts 
below, schoolchildren who cannot speak English are presented as placing a financial strain on 
schools: 
 
The set of perceived burdens brought by school children include economic ones, but are 
also wider-ranging and more general: Educating children who do not speak English as 
their mother tongue also puts a huge financial strain on schools. 
(Daily Mail, 21st February 2014) 
 
Like schoolchildren and immigrants generally, patients who can’t speak English were also 
represented as constituting a financial burden to the taxpayer. For example, in the extract below, 
taxpayers (i.e. readers) are described as ‘picking up’ a translation bill for patients who can’t 
speak English well: 
 
TAXPAYERS have picked up a £13million translation bill for NHS patients who 
cannot speak English. The cost of translators has soared tenfold since 2006, while 
NHS boards have faced huge budget cuts in which thousands of staff will lose their 
jobs. And many NHS bosses admitted they do not know how many people are using 
the service, set up for immigrants and foreign tourists, despite its £13million drain on 
funds. 
(Express, 21st March 2011) 
 
Although the cost cited above is £13 million, other costs given vary between newspapers and 
over time, ranging from £4 million to £13 million, and are attributed not only to the need for 
translators, but also to the hiring of (particularly Polish) nurses to communicate with patients 
during their care, and developing picture charts for patients to point out the meals they would 
like.  
 This passage also demonstrates a curious pattern in our data. By situating translation 
bills and other costs associated with healthcare provision within a broader context of public 
services cuts (in the above example, NHS jobs), people with limited English skills are arguably 
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presented as being in some way to blame for those cuts. It is not possible, in this instance, for 
the newspapers to argue that immigrants are ‘taking jobs’ from British workers, since this 
contradicts the argument that they cannot speak English and do not pay taxes. Nonetheless, 
immigrants are still construed as costing British people their jobs, with the reported costs 
associated with translation services causally linked, by the Express, to ‘budget cuts in which 
thousands of staff will lose their jobs.’ Rather than challenge or criticise the Government over 
its cuts to public spending and blame the enduring austerity economic model ushered in by the 
2010 Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, it is immigrants with limited 
English skills who are blamed for job losses. 
The topoi that we have identified tended not to offer explicit solutions to the problems 
they propose in relation to people not speaking English – instead these tend either to be implied 
or left up to the reader to formulate for themselves. However, at some points, articles in our 
corpus offered quite explicit solutions as part of this topos – specifically that welfare benefits 
should not be given to people who aren’t able to speak English. For example, the Daily Mail 
headline below was taken from an article reporting the outcome of a survey which claimed that 
95 per cent of British people believed that immigrants ‘must speak English’, while 77 per cent 
believed that immigrants ‘should have access to benefits restricted’.  
 
Immigrants must speak English and should have access to benefits restricted, 
say Britons 
(Daily Mail, 17th June 2014) 
 
That these issues are bundled together for the purposes of this headline is evidence that, for the 
Daily Mail at least, immigrants’ rights to claim social welfare benefit should be contingent on 
their ability to speak English. Similarly, other articles proposed that immigrants should learn 
to speak English before they are granted access to healthcare services, as in the example below: 
 
PATIENTS who cannot speak English cost the NHS £16million in interpreters last 
year - nearly double the 2008 figure. The 2012/3 bill could top £20million as 40 of 
161 hospital trusts failed to respond to our Freedom of Information request for details. 
Polish speakers were in greatest demand across trusts which did answer, followed by 
Arabic and Slovak. The Pennine trust spent the most - £4.9million. Urdu was its top 
request. Critics called for immigrants to learn English before being given access 
to services. 
(Sun, 29th July 2013) 
 
The logical extension of this argument is that healthcare professionals should deny care to ill 
people if (and because) they have limited English skills. This is a quite cynical proposal, and 
such a policy would contradict directly one of the founding principles of the NHS – namely 
that care should be provided free for all at the point of use. We also find rather problematic the 
notion that ensuring accurate and effective communication between practitioners and patients 
is somehow a waste of taxpayers’ money, since the level of funding allocated to translation 
services is likely to impact directly on the health and wellbeing of the patients who rely upon 
those most essential services. This argument is also deeply contradictory, given that the 
argument that health professionals should speak English or be ‘struck off’ (explored later in 
our analysis) is itself underpinned by the understanding that patient safety is contingent on 
effective communication between patients and practitioners.  
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Topos of burdening and weighting down 
 
The topos of burdening and weighting down is a causal topos which represents the minority 
out-group as a strain or drain on the members, resources and systems of the in-group (Reisigl 
and Wodak, 2001, p. 78). In some respects, this topos can be related to the topos of finance 
explored in the previous section. In that section, we saw how immigrants who can’t speak 
English are presented in the articles in our corpus as constituting a financial burden to English-
speaking readers/taxpayers, who ‘foot the bill’ for the social welfare benefits claimed by this 
group, as well as more specific costs incurred in the contexts of healthcare provision. However, 
immigrants with limited English skills were also presented as burdensome in other ways – ways 
which ‘weighted down’ in-group native English speakers. This type of threat manifests most 
explicitly in the consumption of public services and in the context of school education in 
particular.   
 
During a phone-in on LBC radio Sir Michael was told by one caller of a local 
school where teachers were having to carry out “double the work” due to a 
“huge influx” of children who could not speak English. 
(Telegraph, 30th October 2014) 
 
Astonishingly, one in nine English schools now has a majority of pupils who do 
not speak English as a first language. The official figures lay bare the enormous 
strain mass migration has placed on our schools  
(Daily Mail, 22nd February 2014) 
 
These examples represent the different impositions that non-native English-speaking children 
are construed as placing on the British education system, which include increasing pressure on 
teachers and necessitating additional interpreting staff. The burdens these children present are 
also linked to immigration generally in ‘influx’ and ‘mass migration’, implicitly placing blame 
on the children’s parents (who immigrated to the UK) as opposed to the children themselves. 
The same is the case in the 2014 example from the Daily Mail, in which ‘mass migration’ has 
placed some form of unspecified ‘strain’ on ‘our’ schools. 
Non-native English-speaking pupils were presented not only as increasing the pressures 
on and workloads of teachers, but this was also construed as actively eroding the access of in-
group English-speaking children to resources, thereby shifting from the topos of burden, to the 
topos of displacement (explored earlier), as in the examples below. 
  
In a growing number of schools special classes are held for children who do not 
speak English costing schools money, wasting teachers' time and harming the 
education of others.  
(Express, 24th November 2014) 
 
Other children are getting less attention in class as teachers have to spend 
longer helping children who do not speak English well and preparing teaching 
materials for them, they [teachers] said. 
(Times, 2nd April 2015) 
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Millions being spent in bid to provide support for eastern European pupils. 
Bilingual staff and textbooks in other languages among services provided. 
British children turned away by schools where more than 25 per cent of pupils 
do not speak English.  
(Daily Mail, 23rd May 2016) 
 
In the first two examples, the extra attention that non-native English-speaking children are 
afforded by teachers because of their limited English skills is represented as actively detracting 
from the attention that is given to ‘other’ (i.e. native English-speaking) children, essentially 
hampering their education. In other words, the resources at stake are teachers’ attention and, 
ultimately, a high-quality education, and the in-group’s access to these resources is being 
encroached upon by the out-group, to the extent that the in-group are now disadvantaged. This 
corresponds with Shuck’s (2006, p. 269) notion of the language of ‘special treatment’, whereby 
‘members of the dominant group are excluded and members of the underrepresented groups 
are given undue advantage’. Shuck argues further that this kind of rhetoric is ‘projected onto a 
model of education as competition, which tends to construct the majority – the invisibly 
privileged – as an oppressed group’ (Shuck, 2006, p. 270). In the third example, this opposition 
is made more explicit through the direct contrasting of (mainly Eastern European) pupils who 
do not speak English against ‘British children’ in the competition for school places – the 
implication being that the allocation of school places to non-British pupils is in some way 
unjust, or that those children are undeserving of such places. Such anti-foreigner sentiment 
only makes sense in a discriminatory framework in which access to resources should be 
restricted on the basis of people’s nationality and, in this case, their native language.  
Fears that children with English as an additional language will ascend to privileged status 
at the expense of native English-speaking children are likely to be further compounded by 
articles reporting that children with English as an additional language academically outperform 
native English-speaking children: 
 
An educational landmark has just been passed that has rather striking implications 
for our school system. Over the weekend, reports confirmed that pupils who 
speak English as an additional language (EAL) - that is, not their first - are now 
outperforming their native, English-speaking counterparts for the first time.  
(independent.co.uk, 6th March 2012) 
 
Children who speak English as a second language are more likely to excel at 
primary school, official figures show, as they reveal that white pupils are falling 
behind. Figures released today by the Department for Education (DfE) reveal that 
non-native speaking children perform better than their English speaking 
counterparts at grammar, punctuation and spelling as well as mathematics. 
(telegraph.co.uk, 15th December 2016) 
 
Pupils who speak English as a second language are outperforming native 
speakers in core GCSE subjects as white British students fall behind 10 other 
ethnic groups, new research showed. White British pupils are lagging behind 
because other ethnic groups are receiving more help from their families. 
(Telegraph, 4th April 2016) 
 
As well as contradicting the notion that pupils are a burden on the school system, such reports 
are likely to be surprising for readers given the media and political backdrop in the UK, which 
typically propagates the normative view that languages other than English are associated with 
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academic underachievement (Blackledge, 2005, p. 226). This apparent over-performance may 
therefore be perceived as problematic or as threatening towards the in-group for a range of 
reasons, but primarily that better academic performance may lead to improved future prospects 
in terms of access to careers, resources and better living standards. In other words, if immigrant 
children achieve highly, this increases the likelihood of the out-group displacing the in-group 
over time. One might expect that having non-native English-speaking children working in good 
jobs is presumably more desirable for the in-group than having them rely on tax-payer funded 
state benefits (as per the topos of finance). However, this seems to be on the proviso that this 
achievement is not at the expense of native English-speaking, British children. 
Another feature of both of the Telegraph examples above is an explicit conflation of 
native language and race, with children who speak English as a second or additional language 
being contrasted to ‘white’ children. Again, this discourse of competitiveness in school 
education is racialised, and discussions about language become discussions about race. Such 
representation serves to sow divisions between the in-group and the out-group, not just on the 
basis of native language, but also race and nationality. Children from each group are 
represented as different, separate and in competition with one another in terms of educational 
access and attainment. 
The strong performance of non-native English-speaking children is framed as a loss of 
‘assets’ rather than a gain for the country. Therefore, pupils with English as a second or 
additional language are discursively forced into a ‘no-win’ situation. Poorly-performing 
children are constructed as burdensome to the education system, to the detriment of native 
English-speaking (white) pupils. However, if they perform well, they are represented as threats, 
not only to the British (and white) children of the in-group, but also to the UK as a country, by 
securing the best jobs and living conditions and fundamentally challenging and potentially 
displacing the ideal and cultural norms of the linguistically (and racially) homogenous nation-
state. 
 
Topos of danger or threat 
 
So far, our analysis has shown how the right-leaning press represent immigrants who can’t 
speak English as broadly constituting a threat towards native English-speakers and UK society 
as a whole through topoi of displacement, finance and burdening and weighting down. In this 
part of this analysis, we consider how immigrants with limited English skills could also be 
represented as constituting a quite literal threat, even danger, to the majority native English-
speaking in-group. As Blackledge (2005, p. 68) puts it, the topos of danger or threat argues that 
if an action bears dangerous or threatening consequences, ‘it should not be performed; or, put 
another way, if there are specific dangers or threats, something should be done to prevent 
[them].’ We observed this topos in articles which reported that some health professionals 
working in the UK are not able to speak English (well), for example: 
 
ALARMINGLY, thousands of doctors cannot speak English properly 
(Express, 22nd March 2011) 
 
Doctors fears: PATIENTS could be at risk after health chiefs admitted some 
doctors can't speak English. 
(Daily Star, 22nd March 2011) 
 
Earlier, we observed the use of aggregation across articles in our data when discussing how 
many people living in the UK can’t speak English. A similar kind of aggregation can be 
observed in the extracts above. However, these and other articles in our corpus also exhibit 
18 
 
imprecision pertaining to exactly how many health professionals can’t speak English 
(quantified above as thousands and some). This kind of vague quantification was only 
observable in relation to doctors and not the other groups (schoolchildren and immigrants more 
generally). The term ‘thousands’ in the example from the Express, though vague, nevertheless 
quantifies the number of doctors who purportedly don’t speak English in a sufficiently large 
amount so as to give the impression that the ‘problem’ they cause is widespread and should be 
a reason for concern (an interpretation further guided by the capitalised adverb 
‘ALARMINGLY’ situated at the start of the clause). Vaguer still, the Daily Star quantifies 
‘some’ doctors as not being able to speak English, which causes ‘fears’ and puts patients ‘at 
risk’. We argue that this imprecise quantifying rhetoric is likely to induce in some readers a 
sense of panic, not just because there are purportedly ‘thousands’ of doctors who cannot speak 
English, but, perhaps more ‘ALARMINGLY’, because nobody quite knows how many doctors 
can’t speak English (and by extension, which ones). In turn, this might give those readers the 
impression that the health authorities (to whom they entrust their health and lives) are not 
sufficiently monitoring or scrutinising the recruitment of healthcare professionals. However, 
in terms of specific cases, there is only one story published within the duration of our corpus 
which reports such an incident: the case of Dr. Daniel Urbani, a German doctor who caused 
the death of a patient by administering the wrong medication (and even in this case, it is not 
clear that Urbani’s English skills were the cause of this mistake; see Baker & McEnery, 2014).  
 
Topos of culture  
 
Immigrants who can’t speak English are also represented as having a disruptive impact on the 
communities and societies in which they live. Such representations are accomplished through 
what Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 80) describe as the topos of culture, wherein the rise in non-
native speakers of English is framed as a threat to social cohesion in, and the cultural values of, 
the UK. We interpreted this topos to manifest textually in a number of different ways, with 
immigrants with limited English skills frequently described as separating themselves from the 
rest of society, for example as: ‘living separately’, ‘living in segregated communities’, ‘failing 
to assimilate into British society’, ‘trapped in their homes’ (particularly Muslim women), ‘not 
full members of society’, ‘not contributing to society’ and ‘not respecting our way of life’. At 
other points, immigrants who can’t speak English are represented as having an active but 
negative influence on society; described variously as: ‘changing communities’, ‘driving a 
wedge through communities’, causing communities to ‘break down’ and ‘ripp[ing] 
communities apart’. To offer an extended example, in the extract below taken from a 2013 
article published by the Express, then-Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government, Eric Pickles, is quoted linking immigrants’ not speaking English to the 
breakdown of communities.  
 
IMMIGRANTS must learn to speak English properly to stop communities 
breaking down, a Cabinet Minister said yesterday. Westminster Communities 
Secretary Eric Pickles warned that newcomers with "broken English" could 
not play a full role in society. And he renewed his attack on councils for wasting 
millions per year on translation services for migrants. "A community of broken 
English is no community at all. That's why we are taking action," Mr Pickles 
said in a newspaper article yesterday. 
(Express, 15th November 2013) 
 
In this example, Pickles goes so far as to forge a discursive link between fluent language skills 
and the very notion of community itself when he states that ‘A community of broken English 
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is no community at all’. There is an implicitly responsibilising logic at work here. If limited 
English skills do indeed threaten social cohesion, as these articles suggest, then readers are left 
in little doubt that this is the fault of the immigrants themselves, who are consistently pitched 
in socially and grammatically agentive terms – i.e. they are the ones who ‘change’, ‘drive 
wedges between’ and ‘rip apart’ communities. There is no suggestion in these articles that any 
of the responsibility for the purported lack of social cohesion should be placed with the other 
members of those communities. We will return to this point in more detail when considering 
the topos of responsibility in the final section of the analysis. 
 
Topos of advantage/usefulness 
 
The topos of advantage/usefulness argues that if an action is considered useful, then it should 
be done. So far, our analysis has revealed some of the topoi on which the right-leaning press 
draws in order to present some immigrants’ purported inability to speak English (well) as 
threatening (in a number of respects) towards native-English speakers and UK society as a 
whole. However, in invoking the topos of advantage/usefuleness, the merits of immigrants 
learning to speak English are framed as advantageous for those minority immigrant groups, 
rather than the native English-speaking majority. Consistent with the topos of culture examined 
in the previous section, the benefits of learning English tended to be framed in terms of helping 
immigrants to better integrate within UK society. To offer a representative example, in this 
extract from the Daily Mail, a Government-ordered review is reported as advising ministers to 
‘force’ immigrants to speak English in order to ‘help them integrate’: 
 
‘Immigrants should be forced to speak English to help them integrate, 
government-ordered review set to advise ministers’ 
(Daily Mail, 2nd December 2016) 
 
However, as Blackledge (2005, p. 68) demonstrates, although the topos of 
advantage/usefulness argues ostensibly for the benefit of the minority group, in the context of 
debates about multilingualism it can often be used to present a more illiberal agenda. It is 
difficult to make strong assertions about the attitudes and intentions of those who wrote and 
edited the articles in our corpus when we only have access to the articles themselves. However, 
the topoi identified elsewhere in our corpus, and which are collectively more pervasive than 
the topos of advantage/usefulness, suggest that it is the interests of the native English-speaking 
in-group (likely the perceived readership(s)) which underpin the agendas of the articles in our 
data. Indeed, there are some discursive clues as to this in the Daily Mail extract above. We 
might question the extent to which the Othering use of the pronoun them (i.e. us vs. them) 
reflects a truly integrative agenda. Moreover, the very notion of ‘forcing’ immigrants to speak 
English and not enjoining native speakers of English to learn other languages adopts something 
of a one-sided perspective on integration – that it is in the interests of immigrants that 
integration is successful and therefore that it is them (and not other members of the community) 
who should be responsible for ensuring social cohesion. This agenda thus seems to be one that 
is less concerned with the idea of integration but has more to do with maintaining the 
dominance of the English language and those who speak it fluently (natively) within UK 
society. Building on the idea of ‘forcing’ immigrants to learn to speak English, the next and 
final section of our analysis explores the topos of responsibility. 
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Topos of responsibility  
 
The topos of responsibility argues that because a group or person is responsible for the way 
things are, that group or person should act to put things right (Blackledge, 2005, p. 72). 
Throughout the articles in our corpus, it is immigrants who are framed as being responsible for 
their (in)ability to speak English and thus, by extension, for the social and economic 
consequences that brings, as in the example below. 
 
Last night Tory MP Nick de Bois said: “Councils have no legal obligation to 
provide translation services. They're currently having to make difficult funding 
decisions and funding excessive translation should not be a priority. The bill for 
interpreting and translating and telephone assisstance was £43.5million. "Those 
needing translation, in many cases, have lived in this country for many years and 
therefore have a responsibility to learn English.” 
(Express, 3rd May 2013) 
 
A consequence of foregrounding immigrants’ responsibility for learning to speak English is 
that the roles and responsibilities of others in this process are backgrounded. In particular, there 
is no explicit acknowledgement in any of the articles across our corpus of the role either of 
other members of communities to learn other languages or of the government to provide 
support for immigrants to help them to learn to speak English and, by extension, to integrate 
more smoothly into society. In fact, in the above extract, Conservative MP Nick de Bois is 
quoted as arguing quite the opposite – that against a backdrop of ‘difficult funding decisions’, 
funding ‘excessive translation should not be a priority’. Yet, these factors are important to bear 
in mind in the context of debates about multilingualism and immigration in the UK, not least 
because the UK has what Hunston (2017) rightly describes as ‘possibly the worst record in the 
world for learning languages’ (see also: Guardian, 2014), but also because the Government has 
imposed funding cuts which have resulted in reduced access to English language lessons for 
UK residents whose first language is not English (TES, 2017).  
We also observed the topos of responsibility in relation to the parents of immigrant 
children. Earlier in our analysis, we saw how the right-leaning press regards the commitment 
of resources to helping children of immigrants to learn English as constituting a burden. 
Consistent with this view, at other points in the corpus, the responsibility for immigrant 
children learning to speak English is placed squarely at the feet of their parents: 
 
The responsibility lies with the parents. If they don't work to make sure their 
children speak English at home, integration is impossible. It is not unreasonable 
to expect incomers to learn the language of their new country. Indeed, not to do 
so is unreasonable. 
(Sunday Express, 24th July 2011) 
 
Listen and learn: parents need to be able to speak English to help their 
children to make progress at school. 
 (Telegraph, 28th July 2011) 
 
These examples were chosen because they broadly represent the arguments put forward in the 
articles in our corpus for why immigrants should be responsible for teaching their children to 
speak English: (i.) to help them to better integrate into UK society (see example from the 
Sunday Express) and (ii.) to help their children to make progress at school (see example from 
the Telegraph). We have already explored both arguments in previous sections of the analysis. 
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However, it is worth pointing out that this type of responsibilising topos is likely to place 
immigrant parents into something of a double-bind. If they do not teach their children to speak 
English well, they can be blamed for their children’s failure to integrate into society, as well as 
for holding other, native English-speaking children back at school (since those children then 
require more attention from teachers). Yet, as we saw in the section on burdening and weighting 
down, if they do teach their children to speak English so that they perform well at school, this 
is likely to evoke the response – from sections of the right-leaning press at least – that those 
children were taking employment opportunities from other, native English-speaking children 
in the future. 
 
Concluding discussion 
  
In the years following the 2011 Census, right-leaning press debates about people who can’t 
speak English have focussed on immigrants, with particular attention paid to public service 
contexts of education (as schoolchildren) and health (as patients and health professionals). Our 
qualitative analysis uncovered the use of seven interconnecting topoi in the representation of 
these groups: (i.) displacement, (ii.) finance, (iii.) burdening and weighting down, (iv.) danger 
or threat, (v.) culture, (vi.) advantage/usefulness and (vii.) responsibility. Collectively, these 
topoi can be interpreted as weaving an over-arching media narrative which problematises and 
Others non-native speakers of English living in the UK. We argue that this narrative is likely 
to invoke or intensify in some native English-speaking readers a kind of linguistic xenophobia 
– a sense of anxiousness about people living in the UK whose first language isn’t English, 
suspicion about their willingness to integrate into society, and fear that linguistic diversity will 
bring about negative consequences for them, their families and UK society as a whole. In light 
of this, we follow Blackledge and Pavlenko (2001, p. 243) in maintaining that such persistently 
negative representations of people on the grounds of their (perceived) English language 
competence is likely to be sufficient to legitimise the social exclusion and active discrimination 
of those who are perceived to be unable or unwilling to fit the linguistic ‘norm’. 
We have argued that the focus on immigrants not speaking English in  public services 
contexts is likely to create a sense in which readers feel personally impacted by immigrants’ 
purported linguistic deficiencies, both as users of those services themselves and as taxpayers 
who ultimately  ‘foot the bill’ when it comes to increased staffing costs and translation bills. 
At the same time, this focus on public services contexts can also be interpreted as speaking 
directly to, and perhaps even contributing towards, public concerns surrounding immigration, 
education and health, all of which featured amongst the top voter concerns in the run up to both 
the 2015 UK General Election and the 2016 EU referendum (Jordan, 2015). It is difficult within 
the scope of a study such as this to hypothesise as to the influence that any section of the media 
(or its readership) has on events taking place in the world, including the outcomes of political 
elections and referenda. However, it seems likely that the discriminatory press discourses that 
we have identified will have shaped many voters’ opinions leading up to the point at which 
they entered the voting booth on these occasions.  
Another consequence of the topoi identified across our corpus is that immigrants are 
responsibilised in regard to ensuring their and their children’s English language competence 
and integration into UK society. A corollary of this responsibilisation, we observed from our 
data, is that immigrants are then accordingly blamed for having limited English skills, as well 
as for the economic, social, cultural and even health-related problems this is purported to bring 
about. As well as overlooking the difficulties that immigrants face in learning a new language 
and when attempting to integrate into unfamiliar communities, in order to situate any blame 
firmly at the feet of the immigrants, the topoi we have identified also serve to obscure the role 
(and any failings) of the Government when it comes to helping immigrants to learn English 
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and assimilate into society, as well as the role of existing members of local communities to 
help newcomers to assimilate. Thus, although we would not argue that it is not beneficial for 
any person to attain a certain level of competence in the language that is spoken most widely 
in the place where they live, we do take issue with the discrimination against people on the 
grounds of their linguistic competence and their perceived unwillingness to learn a language, 
particularly when this discrimination is enabled by the active stripping of important contextual 
factors which serve to constrain immigrants’ abilities to learn English, including cuts in 
Government funding of English language classes. 
As we discussed earlier, topoi are argumentation strategies or structures which postulate 
that if x is the case then y should/should not be done. In some cases, the solutions to the 
problems the topoi posed were stated explicitly within the bodies of the newspaper articles 
themselves, for instance calls for reductions in funding for translation services and for access 
to public services to be restricted for immigrants who can’t speak English. However, solutions 
to the problems that topoi frame need not be explicitly stated as part of the discursive 
instantiations of the topoi themselves, but can instead be implied, or arise implicitly through 
some shared knowledge or common-sense agreement between members of a discourse 
community (i.e. newspapers and their target readerships). Although they did not feature as part 
of our analysis, many of the “below-the-line” comments posted online by readers in response 
to some of the articles in our data offered ‘solutions’ to the problems set up by the topoi in the 
bodies of the articles in the form of implorations – presumably to other readers – to vote at the 
2015 General Election and the 2016 EU referendum in ways that would support an anti-
immigration agenda (e.g. comments like ‘vote leave!’ and ‘vote UKIP!’). Future research 
should study such below-the-line comments as sites where readers can engage with, support 
and challenge the media representations they encounter and, in some cases, as we have 
observed, offer explicit “solutions” to the problems that articles frame. Another way in which 
future research could build on this study would be to compare right-leaning newspaper data 
against articles published by left-leaning media outlets. Although previous research has 
gestured towards the adoption of similar strategies of immigrant and ethnic minority 
representations across the political spectrum (Baker et al., 2013), it is also possible that left-
leaning newspapers might offer counter arguments to the types of topoi we have identified here.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Sunday editions and sister publications are subsumed under the main newspaper name, 
for example Times also covers the Sunday Times. For most newspapers, the counts 
include articles published in print and online editions, for instance the category Daily 
Mail includes articles from the printed version of the newspaper as well as the website 
dailymail.co.uk. The exceptions to this are the Sun and the Times, for which paywalls 
preclude the inclusion of online articles in LexisNexis results. 
2. This skew also partly results from the fact that LexisNexis only stores articles which 
originally appeared in the print version of the tabloid paper, The Sun, and not those 
which appeared on its website. 
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Table 1. Breakdown of the SEC. 
Newspaper Articles Words 
Telegraph 1,091 734,024 
Daily Mail 1,113 645,317 
Times 660 343,712 
Express 451 165,430 
Sun 409 94,270 
Daily Star 130 23,278 
Total 3,854 2,006,031 
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Table 2. Social actor groups and corresponding collocates, ranked by frequency. 
Social actor group 
Corresponding collocates 
(collocation frequency in brackets) 
SCHOOLCHILDREN 
pupils (119) 
children (117) 
students (17) 
schoolchildren (15) 
kids (9) 
boy (6) 
IMMIGRANTS 
immigrants (59) 
migrants (47) 
migrant (19) 
immigrant (9) 
HEALTH 
doctors (49) 
nurses (38) 
patients (26) 
doctor (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
